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PROFESSOR CROSSKEY AND THE BROODING
OMNIPRESENCE OF ERIE-TOMPKINS
CaA~Es E. CLAB4t
ROFESSOR CROSSxEY'S NEW BOOK on the Constitution' is an exciting
work. It is exciting for a reason as unique as it is admirable with
respect to this type of book, namely, the intellectual punch it
delivers. We are accustomed to stately works ringing the now accepted
changes of reverence to the Constitution in its modern guise as fashioning
a union of diverse, almost warring, states. Occasionally--so much so as
now to be almost a rarity-we do find specific criticism of the creaking
governmental structure which results and some despairing hope for
change in the direction of modern efficiency.2 But this opus is something
quite different and beyond our experience. For it is a new history, the
fruit of nearly two decades of patient research, which presents the direct
challenge that the original plan and intent of the Constitution was the
creation of a simply conceived national government. A possibility of
simplicity in place of infinite complexity, of effective functional action
instead of near-paralysis amid competing sovereignties, is surely alluring.
And with proof so detailed and withal so persuasive as here afforded, we
must hail this as a major scholastic effort of our times.
The feat of scholarship is perhaps the more remarkable when we come
to see that the author's main thesis rests upon an utterly simple approach:
interpreting the letter of the great document primarily in accordance with
eighteenth century views of language, form, and substance. With pro-
priety he calls the resulting panorama "A Unitary View of the National
Governing Powers." 3 Emerging fully as clear cut are his correlative and
supporting theses. Of these, the two he singles out for the greatest stress
are "The National Power over Commerce ' 4 and "The National Judicial
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
I Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (1953) (here-
after cited only by part, chapter, or page).
2 The boldest of recent times appears to be Finletter, Can Representative Government Do
the Job? (1945). See also Clark, The Dilemma of American judges: Is Too Great "Trust for
Salvation" Placed in Them? 35 A.B.A.J. 8, and other references given at 80, 81 (1949).
3 This is made the title heading of Part m, pp. 361-708.
4 Part 1, pp. 15 - 2 9 2 .
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Powers."' These, too, a reviewer may pinpoint to illustrate the author's
method and approach.
First, as background we must note the infinite pains taken to recreate a
vocabulary which appropriately mirrors the eighteenth century mind
operating in the constitutional framework. Thus we have an extensive
catalogue of all manner of usage in pre-convention days of the term
"commerce," showing, indeed, its broad inclusiveness. The same process
is employed as to the other terms of the constitutional grant over com-
merce; and the pre-constitution usage is supported by the contemporary
discussions centering around the making of the Constitution and the
notable debate which preceded its adoption in the states. This leads
directly to the constitutional interpretation, in terms generally of strong
governmental powers, which prevailed originally and which has suffered
a gradual decline to the weaker governmental entity we now know.
It is against this tapestry, so fully displayed before the reader's eye, that
the famous clauses undergo a revitalization of meaning and take on new
dynamism. Consider the first power listed, that of the legislature, and the
first general statement of its authority beyond the power to tax and to
borrow money, to wit, the power "To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'
The middle phrase has suffered a debasement down to our modem concept
of power over only "interstate commerce," famous words of modem
times, but unknown to the man of 1787 and dating apparently from the
middle of the last century. Others of the constitutional words have also
suffered sea-change by shrinkage: '"among" becomes "between"; the
states are now mere territorial subdivisions between which some physical
movement has become visualized; and "commerce" itself has been nar-
rowed to mean only a special kind of business enterprise. Hence the phrase
now is reduced to permitting some limited control over this restricted
form of enterprise only when it actually and visibly moves "from the
territory of one of our states to that of another." But under our author's
compelling exegesis the phrase comes to life as including all matters of
trade or business activity had among or within the states all over the
country, and supports and justifies the widest congressional supervision
of the affairs of men considered as people of a single union. Thus, for ex-
ample, we should not need to await the tedious and only partial accom-
plishment of -the strongly urged uniform commercial acts-with a uniform
5 See particularly cc. XX, XXI, pp. 610-74; also Part IV, pp. 711-1046.
6 U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, discussed pp. 17 et seq.
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law of divorce not even dared-to secure the benefits of free commerce
subject to like law throughout the states.7 Instead, Congress is sum-
moned, even in the dedication of the book, "to claim and exercise for the
common good of the country the powers justly belonging to it under the
Constitution," 8 including that of formulating just such commercial codes
and general social laws as are here contemplated.
A similar demonstration leads to the conclusion-further discussed
below-that the original constitutional intent was to create a single na-
tional judicial system, with the Supreme Court at the apex of all courts,
state and federal. 9 Briefer treatment sets forth the interrelationship with
the Commerce Clause of other provisions of Article I, notably the Imports
and Exports, Ex post facto, and Contracts Clauses.1'
To do even partial justice to the demonstration, some brief reference
must be made to certain other features of the supporting argument. Thus
it is held that accepted rules of eighteenth century approach to state
documents require recognition of the custom to state an intent as an
inclusive generality, followed by an enumeration of details of an informa-
tive, but not exclusive, character. Hence the enumeration of the powers of
Congress-now made the bulwark for the limiting interpretation of the
Constitution-is held not to subtract just the specified powers from the
states. Rather it is addressed primarily to a different dichotomy, that
between legislative and executive powers in the one unitary governmental
system set up; the balance here inclined toward the legislature, an em-
phasis needed if the historic power of the royal prerogative was to be
lessened and the dangerous weakness of the earlier Congress to be cor-
rected." Finally to be dissected is the famous Tenth Amendment, reserv-
ing to the states or the people "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States."
' u Here the
solution is that made, among others, and again from an eighteenth century
background, by no less a person than James Kent in a decision in New
York in 1812,"3 to the effect that the powers not exclusively transferred to
the United States or prohibited to the states may still be exercised by the
latter, as well as by the people.
Even this inadequate summary shows how revolutionary this thesis is
7 See particularly pp. 32, 37, 292. 9 See note 5 supra.
S P. v. 10 Cc. X-Xfl, pp. 295-360.
11 Cc. XIII-XVII, pp. 363-562.
'2 U.S. Const. Amend. 10, discussed in c. XXII, pp. 675-708.
13 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 507 (1812).
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to an age which is accustomed to see the states successfully fighting the
national government on all stages, from control of precious national re-
sources to exercise of taxing and regulatory powers in many forms and
guises. Does the author adequately prove his case? Only an historian of
quite a degree of sophistication can judge with finality and as to details.
But for the ordinary reader and patriotic citizen, anxious for his govern-
ment to exercise effective leadership in the global role now thrust upon it,
Professor Crosskey surely proves enough to require a fresh approach in
our constitutional thinking. For at the very least he does demonstrate
beyond what seems to me the possibility of doubt (1) that an exceedingly
powerful argument can be made for a widespread eighteenth century
intent or desire for a stronger central government than we have now
evolved, (2) that the constitutional language is much more apt to sustain
such an intent than our juristic thought now concedes, (3) that consider-
able early thought, including Supreme Court decisions, so interpreted the
infant Constitution, and (4) that exigencies of political strife shaped and
molded the great charter to its present form.
Although I suspect the contrary will be the case, the last of these points
I have stressed ought not to come as a shock or even as a surprise to a
generation accustomed to a realistic approach to law and legal actions.
We know that contracts and legal documents generally may be variously
interpreted against different backgrounds, particularly where new circum-
stances bring new problems not appreciated in the original bond. So even
the words of a written Constitution may acquire quite a different sig-
nificance as the years pass. And the reasons why the Jeffersonians, repre-
senting broadly the masses as against the propertied classes, should have
feared the power of a strong government, should have demanded a Bill of
Rights and all the rest, seem now but a natural commonplace of the time.
That the states, in the vacuum of power which the struggle tended to
create, should be the obvious, but rather unintended, beneficiaries is also
but a natural, even if chance, re~ult. But here the author has seemingly
courted opposition by the truculence with which he presents his views and
the virulence of his condemnation of the politicians. Madison's star has
perhaps dimmed, since his obvious changes of opinion to correspond with
his politics do not evoke sympathy. But Jefferson is still a mighty force;
condemnation of his actions even to the point of rehabilitating the Sedi-
tion Act was hardly necessary. It is likely to stimulate reactions such as
those of one professorial reviewer who betrayed an emotional investment
in the constitutional status quo curious to behold; he even suggested the
19s31
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unworthiness of a university press which would stoop to publish this
original new work !14
In truth the author's combativeness here may appear surprising; for,
except in some matters of degree, the difference in party spirit and pro-
gram of the era is well accepted.15 But the author does carry it further
than is customary. He has both Jefferson and Madison as early National-
ists who departed from the faith for reasonp political, while Marshall is
shown fighting merely a rear guard and constantly losing struggle, full of
compromises, turns, and twists, to preserve a semblance of strength to the
central government. So personal does he make this struggle and the
motivations of the distinguished protagonists that many are likely to be
turned away from his important thesis. Having known the author in all
his forthrightness and obduracy from his student days, I can, I think,
understand how his own conception of truth would not permit him to
yield even the proverbial ell to the humanness of politicians. If the great
X was that kind of petty heel, it must be so stated. Moreover, such a sense
of personal involvement in long ago battles was doubtless necessary to
sustain research so exhaustive for so many years with so little of definite
encouragement from any source except one's own inner strength of char-
acter. Actually of course politicians and statesmen are neither so admirable
nor so despicable as contemporaries and posterity love to make them.
They can and often do operate from motives far from sublime, even those
which are petty and vengeful; in short they cannot avoid acting like
human beings. And yet they do represent movements and trends which
must come to the fore, if not through one group of protagonists then
through another. There is an inevitability about conflict and change in
affairs governmental which we must accept and expect.
But nothing so pusillanimous-as this appeals to our author. Here is one
person at least who is not inhibited by idol worship in an area where that
has become an occupational disease and who, to use the apt Americanism,
sticks his neck out to the utmost limit on all matters in which he pro-
foundly believes. Thus I can think of no other instance of an author not
only making his own detailed personal index, but carrying his argument
over into it.' 6 Further, the book contains many an extensive deduction or
14 Swisher, Evolution of a Document, 36 Saturday Review, No. 14, at 33,34 (Apr. 4, 1953).
1 Thus a pertinent brief summary has just appeared in Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia:
Champion of States' Rights-Foe of John Marshall, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1242 (1953).
16 Consider, for example, p. 1396: "Jefferson, Thomas: admits payments of money to
J. T. Callender, 780; admits truth of Walker charge, 779-80; as advocate of general national
legislative authority, in 1775, 1787, and 1788, 212, 764 note; ... approves Connecticut libel
prosecutions, 773; attempt of, to seduce friend's wife, 779; ... deceptive account of Connect-
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assumption advanced boldly to fill gaps in factual material and to supply
motivations. This is the kind of book it is; and, even though I would have
toned down some of the truculence, I find something attractive in the
forthrightness of the slashing attack. I can foresee that scholars will fall
on many of the assumptions with delight, and will demolish at least some.
But, except for surface reactions, that cannot demolish the book itself or
refute the author's central ideas. Crosskey may not have succeeded in
getting himself liked; but he cannot be ignored. After this no book on
constitutional history or meaning can afford to overlook his researches.
Hence this is glorious material for the professional historian, be his
sympathies for or against the thesis presented. But I suggest it is much
more than this; it is in fact a must for lawyers, political scientists, and
plain ordinary citizens. For it brings up insistently the issue of the kind of
government needed not merely for 1787, but also for 1953. I realize that
the first reaction to the author's argument by the lay reader is likely to
be: So what? After all, the Court responding to pressures over a century
and a half has construed the Constitution as it has; and the people have
surely accepted the result, nay, are belligerent against any (outward)
change. So it will be said: Let's leave to the students these faraway bat-
tles, while we go about our business of returning just as much power to the
states as the pressure of world and local events will permit. The trouble is,
however, that the militant advocates of the status quo have been able to
seize an advantage which is not rightfully theirs. They have claimed all
the support of the sacred document itself to use against those upstarts
who assert a national power as a matter of right and necessity. Against
such a heavy burden the forces of centralized efficiency can make only
difficult headway without vicarious support from those twin forces of
evil, to wit, war or depression. Except when those forces make the need
overwhelming, we rrust be bound to a government the more inactive, i.e.,
the' more unobtrusive, the better. American genius can be expended to
perfecting the automobile, discovering new labor devices for farm, factory,
and home and uncovering the atom bomb. Only in matters governmental
must it remain bound by chains of the past.
So the great function of a book such as this is to show that these chains
are hardly real and, in any event, are comparatively recent and man-
icut libel prosecutions by, in 1809, 784 note; disloyalty of, to Washington, whilst in his
cabinet, 767; duplicity of, on freedom of press, 767-84; ... orders dismissal of Connecticut
libel prosecutions upon learning what they concern, 781," etc. Also p. 1393: "Frankfurter,
Felix: on Constitution as ultimate touchstone, 318, 906; on Constitution as not ultimate
touchstone, 318," etc.
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made, to be unmade in like fashion if the will exists. In short, the purpose
of history is to free man from the shackles of pseudo-history. We should be
masters of our fate governmentally as much as physically, institution-
wise as much as gadget-wise. And the days of planned experimentation in
new ways of living together should definitely not be over. For if we do not
take active measures with intelligent effort, the change is going to take
place in any event imperceptibly and in ways we not only may not expect,
but certainly do not want. Such a book as this teaches overwhelmingly
that change is coming in any event, no matter how unchanging may seem
our govexnmental charter and its basic exposition.
That leads me to what I consider a wholly fascinating example of this
process, both because of its recent operation before our very eyes and
because of its far-xeaching consequences. This is what I have chosen else-
where to term the "brooding omnipresence" of the Erie-Tompkins case.17
That decision, as every lawyer knows, in 1938 overruled more than a
century of precedents to require federal courts to show the most complete
subservience to substantive state decisions in all issues touching state law
coming before them.
It might be expected that Professor Crosskey's wide-ranging and
iconoclastic investigations would dredge up new thoughts and new ap-
proaches to this controversial subject. So he does, with incidental attacks
on the state of legal scholarship which permitted one historical article to
have so profound an effect on reversing previous trends, and with a re-
habilitation of the greatness of Justice Story, who had come to be viewed
as a vain little man with only the most naive of conceptions as to the
nature of law itself. The exposition details, in fact, three major stages of
development, of which the overruled Swift v. Tyson' represented not the
original, but a halfway or intermediate, step toward the state supremacy
we now have. So let us follow our author back to the Constitution and his
view of "The National Judicial Powers under an Eighteenth-Century
Interpretation" of the document, which makes natural "the Supreme
Court's Judicial Supremacy and the Common-Law Jurisdiction of the
Courts of the United States."'19
1 7 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Clark, State Law in the Federal
Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L.J. 267 (1946). Compare
Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Southern P. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917): "The
common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified"-a critique of law accepted as the base
of the Erie decision. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101; 102 (1945).
18 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842).
19 C. XX, pp. 610-40.
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We need not repeat here the process of interpretation outlined above,
but proceed at once to the conclusion, which is that indicated by the
chapter heading just quoted. The most important for our immediate
purposes are the Supreme Court's stewardship of the entire court system
of the nation and the acceptance for the federal courts of the existence of
a national common law, that being the common law of the mother coun-
try, England. The demonstration is too long to give in detail; it follows
quite naturally from the supremacy over state laws or constitutions to be
accorded to the "laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance" of, i.e., under, the Constitution, with the law-making power con-
strued as broadly as is stated above.2 0 But the initial interpretation itself
is interesting, indeed fascinating.21 Thus it involves acceptance by the
early leaders of a common law of crimes, involving criminal libel invoked
at Jefferson's behest against, among others, a Connecticut clergyman,
Azel Backus. But most striking in view of later doctrine is a now over-
looked decision by the Supreme Court in 1805, Marshall writing, where
the Court assumed without hesitation to declare a question of state local
land law contrary to the view of the state courts. The case is Huidekoper's
Lessee v. Douglass,2 where the Court construed a Pennsylvania statute of
1792 defining grants of the state's vacant lands in the West Allegheny or
northwest area of the state to uphold, as against the state, conveyances to a
land company, contrary to the holding of the state supreme court four
years earlier in Commonwealth of Pennsylvarnia v. Coxe.23 The author's
thoroughness appears particularly in connection with this case; to show
its initial wholehearted acceptance, the later trend toward evasion of its
principle, and the final acceptance of its consequence, with some demur-
ring by the state, he has apparently examined all records--official, news-
paper, and otherwise, together with local correspondence of public officials
and judges as disclosed by the local offices and historical societies of the
region.2 4 The importance of the case is clear. Here was the natural su-
premacy of the Court accepted without question in an area now termed
the "clearest kind" of case for application of the Erie-Tompkins doctrine
of state law supremacy.2
20 See pp. 984-1002 construing the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. 6.
2' C. XXII, The Initial Recognition of the Supreme Court's Position as the Nation's Ju-
ridical Head, pp. 711-53.
"23 Cranch (U.S.) 1 (1805).
234 DalI. (U.S.) 170 (1801). 24 Pp. 719-53.
2The expression is taken from the recent case of Waterhouse v. Hoover, 203 F. 2d 171
(C.A. 6th, 1953).
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But all this was soon to change. A chapter which describes the 'oss of
the Common-Law Jurisdiction" of the national judiciary begins thus:
Among the causes of the Supreme Court's decline as the nation's juridical head,
which began in the 1820's, first place must be given to the original national JudiciaryAct
of 1789, which the First Congress under the Constitution enacted. For there were in
that act at least two features that operated powerfully to postpone and, in the end,
defeat the great judicial reform which the framers of the Constitution intended. The
first of these was the Supreme Court's great remoteness, under the act, from the trial
courts of the states; the second was the relative inaccessibility of the national trial
courts which the act set up, as compared with the similar state tribunals.26
Soon Marshall himself was conceding the decline ;7 and there came the
rise of another principle, that of the "Theory of Two, Independent Judi-
ciaries without a Common Head. '28 The situation is perfectly illustrated
in 1842, after Marshall's death, by the celebrated case of Swift v. Tyson,
2 1
written by Justice Story, the senior member of the Court in service. That
decision involved an aspect of general commercial law-whether a pre-
existing debt owed by the endorser to the endorsee of a bill of exchange
was such consideration as would render the bill "negotiable" to cut off
defenses good between the original parties. There being some question
whether New York law on this issue might be different from that accepted
in the federal courts, Story assumed only to declare a federal or general
law applicable in commercial matters of wide extent and ramification in
businesses naturally transcending state laws. Although this has latterly
been viewed as a bold and arrogant assumption of power, it was actually
modest indeed. Our author regards it as part of that rear guard action to
which Marshall himself had been forced in an endeavor to save some
vestiges of national power. Certainly the precedents of the time show it
far from a rash innovation.3 0
It is this case which brought forth the scorn of judges and writers until
at length it was suddenly overruled and even declared unconstitutional
by a divided court without argument on the point. The latter is of course
the famous Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,31 undoubtedly the most cited judicial
precedent of modern times.3 2 The decision was dedicated to the establish-
2 C. XXIV, p. 754.
27Note, for example, such a case as Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. (U.S.) 291 (1832), while
Marshall was still on the Court.
2
3C. XXV, pp. 818-64. 29 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842).
80 See extensive discussion, p. 856 et seq.
31304 U.S. 64 (1938); see note 17 supra.
32Indeed, frequency of citation seems on the increase. Shepard's United States Citations
contains less than 8 full columns of citations of the decision in the original volume to 1943,
but the 1943-52 Supplement contains 161 columns, and the July, 1953, pamphlet, 3 columns.
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ment of an exceedingly simple and appealing principle. But its mandate
has proven quite as confusing and complex in its application. The simple
proposition is that litigants should not be subject to one law in one court
and a different law in another court in situations otherwise identical. And
the complexity arises from the attempt to carry out this view where not
one government but forty-nine separate sovereignties, with varying rules
of law, are assumed to be supreme, or at least are owed obeisance.
It is possible, and Professor Crosskey's researches tend to show, that
such a division of power as was contemplated under the Swift v. Tyson rule
and such a two-headed system could never continue and that eventually
one branch must prove the stronger and more dominant. The present
writer has believed the contrary, 33 thinking that the approach best defined
in decisions of Justice Cardozo34 of "a benign and prudent comity" where-
by the federal courts would accept state principles where really apposite,
but would not be forced to rigorous and arbitrary extremes in so doing,
presented a flexible and a working solution to a difficult problem hardly
susceptible of resolution solely into blacks and whites.35 But events seem
to prove otherwise. There were cases showing an unattractive jockeying
for position in the federal courts to get away from state litigation. Al-
though these, as Crosskey points out, were capable of other solutions,36
they opened the way for strong arguments as to the unfairness of the then
existing rule as applied to the "diversity" cases, i.e., those which would
have arisen in the state courts except for the accident that the parties
were citizens of different states and hence entitled to a federal forum
under the Constitution. Such arguments were- helped by an article by the
major historian of the Court showing discovery of an early draft of the
First Judiciary Act which contained an inclusive meaning of what be-
came "the laws of the several states" in the famous Section 34 of this
The 1953 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part to 22 Fed. Dig. has 81 pages of direct rulings,
§§ 359-2, as against 23 pages in the original volume of 1940.
33 And so stated in the article cited note 17 supra, referring to the decisions in note 34infra.
4 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335,339 (1934); Hawks v. Hamill,288 U.S. 52 (1933); Marine Nat. Exchange Bk. of Milwaukee v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 293
U.S. 357 (1934).
No pun is intended with respect to the famous case cited note 36 infra, which did somuch to provoke the Erie-Tompkins doctrine.
Thus, the notorious Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), allowing a corporation to escape state law by dissolving inthe original state and reincorporating elsewhere to become a "diverse" citizen of its originalown state, rested upon a much criticized fiction as to corporate citizenship. See McGovney, ASupreme Court Fiction, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943).
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Act.37 But Crosskey does not find this newly discovered document surpris-
ing, or as compelling of the one single conclusion of complete federal sub-
ordination as the Court assumed; and he is particularly scornful of the
low state of legal scholarship which failed to point this out.3 8 At any rate
the Court, albeit by a narrow majority, made the sharp turn toward rigid
conformity with state law and has since enforced it relentlessly as a gen-
eral principle, although with somewhat surprising variations of detail.
Fifteen years of steady litigation to determine the meaning of Erie-
Tompkins have left a toll of still further need for litigation, with many
areas unsettled.39 There has been in some respects expansion, in some
respects limitation, from what seemed to be the doctrine as first an-
nounced. The limitation has been in the area of federal rights and federal
specialties; a government-issued check has rather surprisingly been held
not subject to state commercial law,40 while bankruptcy, copyright, and
now perhaps trademarks have been held in varying degrees subject to a
federal uniform law.4' On the other hand, the most troublesome expansion
3 Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,37 Harv. L. Rev.
49 (1923).
8 Pp. 626-28, 820, 857-59, 866-937, 1170, 1171.
31 Both the case law and the legal literature are so extensive, and so constantly expanding,
as to defy citation here. Even the critical titles of some of the articles are interesting: Keeffe,
Gilhooley, Bailey and Day, Weary Erie, 34 Corn. L: Q. 494 (1949); Harnett & Thornton,
Precedent in the Eerie-Tompkins Manner: A Decade in Retrospect, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 770
(1949); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 Vand. L.
Rev. 711 (1950); Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 Ind. L.J. 1 (1949), 21 Okla.
B.AJ. 619 (1950). There has also been some recent notable support to the effect that the Erie
doctrine is neither so objectionable nor so extensive as the other authors have concluded.
Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect: An Analysis of its Proper Area and Limits, 35
A.B.A.J. 19 (1949); Moore's Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code 320, 359 (1949). My
article, cited note 17 supra, contains references to existing authority to its date; later references
have been added to a forthcoming reprinting of the essay in a book of legal essays sponsored by
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The articles and cases cited below are
only a fraction of those available, but may be taken as illustrative of the deluge now inundating
the federal courts.
40 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 744 (1943). For other examples, see
Clark, op. cit. supra note 17, at 284, 285. See also Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 154 F. 2d
978, 1000-1002 (C.A. 2d, 1946), noted in 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1286 (1946); United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), and Francis v. Southern P. Co., 333 U.S. 445
(1948), both extensively discussed in the law reviews; Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S.
294 (1949); Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 Harv.
L. Rev. 966 (1946).
4' There has been, however, considerable conflict as to details. See, e.g., Austrian v.Williams,
198 F. 2d 697 (C.A. 2d, 1952), cert. den. 344 U.S. 909 (1952), extensively criticized in Federal
Modification of State Law: Erie and the Bankruptcy Statute of Limitations, 62 Yale LJ.
479 (1953), and discussed in other review notes; Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F. 2d 517
(C.A. 2d, 1953); and Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, 193 F. 2d 77, 79-82 (C.A. 2d,
1951) compared with Hyde Park Clothes v. Hyde Park Fashions, 204 F. 2d 223 (C.A. 2d,
1953), dealing with the law of trademarks and unfair competition; also Stevens, Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 246 (1950); Hill,
The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1953).
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has come in the dichotomy of substance and procedure. The latter, being
the adjective law by and under which the courts operate, has admittedly
been under the control of the Supreme Court itself; with the adoption of
new federal rules of civil procedure by the Court just before announcement
of its Tompkins decision, a new era of reformed and simple court action
was inaugurated, one widely acclaimed as model for the states and indeed
in process of rather extensive adoption in the several states.4 But as
Crosskey says, "friends of the new rules had to whistle very loudly to keep
their courage up, after the York decision."43 This was a decision in 194514
wherein the Court redefined substance to include anything which might
substantially affect the outcome of the case, and thus relegated the pro-
cedure which is alone subject to federal control to such a narrow compass
in the diversity cases as to have no significant scope, as later decisions
indicate. 45 So the present situation as to this cherished court reform is
that, as a text writer has cynically, but shrewdly, advised, 46 a lawyer in
these cases had better pursue the more technical form of procedure, state
or federal, in his instant situation in order to be safe. And since as a corol-
lary a state enactment or decision depriving a state court of jurisdiction is
held to have a like effect on a federal court in a corresponding diversity
case,47 Professor Crosskey concludes: "So, in the end, even the Supremacy
Clause has been rewritten by the Court, in its mad pursuit of its unattain-
able, unconstitutional Erie object."4 8
Two other pressing problems must be stated, though they do not
exhaust the possibilities. The first concerns what lawyers call the problem.
of the conflict of laws, resulting from the interaction of differing state
principles of law.49 The original Erie-Tompkins decision merely required
42 Clark, Code Pleading 23-31, 51-54 (2d ed., 1947); Clark, The Federal Rules in State
Practice, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 520 (1951); Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in His-
torical Perspective (1952), passim.
41 P. 1367, citing my article note 17 supra. He might have added further works of mine,
e.g., book reviews in 36 Corn. L. Q. 181, 184 (1950) and 4 Vand. L. Rev. 392, 395 (1951).
44 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108, 109 (1945).
4 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949). Mr. Justice Rutledge dissented in all three cases, 337 U.S. 557. These cases, together
with the York and Bullington cases, notes 44, 47, have been the subject of critical comment
in the law reviews too extensive to document here.
46 Federal Procedure: The "Outcome" Test Applied in Actions Based on Diversity of
Citizenship, 35 Corn. L.Q. 420 (1950).
47 Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
48 p. 933.
49 The type of problem is indicated in Professor Cavers' review in 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1327
(1953) of Marsh, Marital Property in Conflict of Laws. See also such articles as Harper, The
Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 Col. L. Rev. 883 (1947); Wolkin, Conflict of
Laws in the Federal Courts: The Erie Era, 94 U. Pa. L. Rev. 293 (1946); Silving, Analogies
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the federal court sitting in New York City to apply the law of Pennsyl-
vania to govern a railroad accident occurring in the latter state; it gave no
thought to what law the New York courts might apply to this situation.
Later cases have supplied the refinement that the federal court, being for
the immediate purpose but another court of the state where it is sitting,
must apply the law of that state strictly.60 So there is a kind of double
separation from the immediate objective in any case which has arisen at a
distance from the particular courthouse. The federal judge must try to
ascertain what a state court judge would apply as the law of the "foreign"
state where the "cause of action" arose. Of course complications increase
rapidly when, in our swiftly moving and far-flung commercial civilization,
a cause really arises in and concerns not one, but two or many states. But
beyond these obvious difficulties of federal orientation in modern business
life there is the equally obvious opportunity now afforded for playing one
court against another, to stop which was the prime reason for the Erie case
in the first place. As Crosskey puts it: "Yet it manifestly was a certainty,
surely apparent to the Court, that, by its decision, it was creating a new
motive for jockeying by litigants, not, it is true, to get into the state
court, or the national court, of a particular state, but to get into the
national court of whichever of our states may happen to have a conflict-of-
laws rule fa-;orable to a particular party's laim or defense."
5 ' The result
has disclosed adjudications which appear fully as anomalous as, if not
more than, anything in the pre-Erie era. In one notable case
2 a litigant
was able by the greater facilities of federal procedure to raise an issue in a
Texas federal court which he would not be in a position to reach in the
state court, and then to obtain a favorable result by application of a legal
principle of the law of insurance recognized in only Texas and Quebec.
The question was one of interpleader between citizens of Texas and
citizens of New York involving the proceeds of a policy of insurance
issued by a New Jersey company; the mere fact that the Texas claimants
could sue the insurance company in the Texas federal court as a "diverse
Extending and Restricting Federal Jurisdiction; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and the Law of Con-
flict, 31 Iowa L. Rev. 330 (1946); Wolfson, Uniform Law and the Federal Courts Under the
Erie Doctrine, 23 Temp. L.Q. 404 (1950).
60 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313
U.S. 498 (1941). Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissent, note 45 supra, 337 U.S. 557, 560 n. 1, has
pointed out this extension of the original doctrine; and see Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,
345 U.S. 514 (1953).
1 Pp. 928, 929.
" Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). See New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence,
104 F. 2d 665, 668 (C.A. 2d, 1939).
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citizen" to them, and that the latter then had the benefit of federal inter-
pleader to exonerate it on citing in the New York claimants and paying
the money into court, resulted in the non-applicability of the more general
rule applied in New York and New Jersey.
The other pressing problem is as to the mere ascertainment of the state
law which is thus to be so slavishly applied. On many occasions the state
court has not spoken; this is particularly true of problems arising out of
state law as to conditional sales, chattel mortgages, trust receipts, but only
coming to a head when the parties meet in the federal bankruptcy court.
On others only an inferior state court has spoken; though its views may
not seem persuasive, yet they have been held controlling. In a notable
case the federal courts were directed to follow a state ruling in New Jersey
where later the New Jersey courts admitted the cogency of the original
federal ruling as a matter of judicial sense and followed it, though "re-
versed on a different point. '53 Here in a very real sense the federal judges,
in spite of all the pains taken to make them so, are unlike their brethren in
the corresponding state courts; their role is limited to that of "ventrilo-
quist's dummy '5 4 as to state law, while their state brethren, even the
lowliest of them, may use their best mental and intellectual powers to
reach results which satisfy their minds. In consequence where a state
doctrine seems fast becoming obsolete, a litigant in the federal courts is
at a serious disadvantage; for the state judge may declare the doctrine
dead, while the federal judge may not.55
We need not accept the most extreme of the Crosskey strictures to find
the present situation vastly disturbing. For my part, I must regard it as
more troublesome, over a wider area of confusion, than was the pre-Erie
rule, unfair as that occasionally proved to be. And the consequence seems
so hard to avoid, so practically inevitable, under our present system of
divided or relinquished supremacy. I am indicating some criticism of re-
cent Supreme Court decisions, as I believe is still the right and privilege of
all "inferior" judges. But I am bound to add that, however I might change
53 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940), rev'g. Field v. Fidelity Union
Trust Co., 108 F. 2d 521 (C.A. 3d, 1939), which was approved and followed on its substantive
point in Hickey v. Kahl, 129 N.J. Eq. 233, 19 A. 2d 33 (1941); Lester v. Guenther, 132 N.J.
Eq. 496, 28 A. 2d 777 (1942), and other cases cited by Crosskey, p. 1366. For biting criticism
of the "unbelievable decision," see Crosskey, pp. 922-27.
' Frank, J., in Richardson v. C.I.R., 126 F. 2d 562, 567 (C.A. 2d, 1942).
See discussion by Crosskey at 918 et seq., 929 et seq., and by me in 55 Yale L. J. 267, at
290-95 (1946). The point is illustrated by such a case as Newkirk v. C. C. Bradley & Son, 271
App. Div. 658, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 459 (4th Dept., 1947), repudiating the view of New York law
taken as compelled in Droste v. Harry Atlas Sons, 145 F. 2d 899 (C.A. 2d, 1944), 147 F. 2d
675 (C.A. 2d, 1945), cert. dismissed 325 U.S. 891 (1945).
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the individual pieces about, I should arrive at no less or little less jerry-
built structure than the present process of judicial inclusion and exclusion
has produced. Nor are we at the end of all development; it is perfectly
clear that the rules are even now shifting as to several details. I anticipate
-perhaps as a matter of hope rather than of definite omen-reading-that
the trend to minimize the area of procedure will halt, that the scope of
federal law will expand, that the conflicts-of-laws problems will be reduced
in number and scope. For example, the most recent decision of the Court
on the latter problem, rendered this spring, seems to find a considerable
number of the justices ready to return to the original Erie conception that
Pennsylvania law, rather than New York's conception of Pennsylvania
law, should govern. 6 Some solution will appear, even if we cannot proph-
esy just what that will be.
Of course it would be simple to turn to Crosskey's solution. "All that
would be necessary would be to abandon the unconstitutional Erie case
and return to Swift v. Tyson and Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass. For
those two cases, with the Supreme Court's Constitutionally granted
juridical supremacy added thereto, would bring about order and uni-
formity in our law."57 This is recommended not only for this "the most
fundamental and far-reaching error the Supreme Court has ever made,"
' ,,
but also for the other "unconstitutional"' diminutions of national au-
thority; for "it will not be forgotten it is the Constitution, and not the
Supreme Court's accumulated errors about it, which Congress and the
Justices take oath 'to support,' and the President swears he will 'preserve,
protect, and defend.' "59 Before such a bold spirit and so sublime a con-
fidence I can only bow in admiration. Were the making of the government
to be done over, I can hardly believe that it would not be along lines
Crosskey advocates as still the true ones. I cannot subscribe to the view
that the only way to freedom is via an inefficient and thereby hopelessly
weak government. I do not believe man is so little master of his fate that
only by putting stones in his way may he be trusted to walk at all. I
believe that an effective government which can be made responsive to
the will of its constituents is a necessity for survival. But even so, I cannot
see signs that we are yet mature enough to accept the challenge. Yet new
threats of war, new depths of depression may in time lead us to a new
orientation of purpose and objectives ivhereby "We, the People of the
"Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
67 P. 934.
P. 1169. 5 P. vii.
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United States," may act "to form a more perfect Union," to "establish
Justice," and to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our posterity."6 0 When that time comes I cannot
believe but that devoted attempts such as this to ascertain what was
originally purposed and how results fell short of objectives will play a
large part in shaping our heavenly city of the future.
60These quotations are from the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, which of coursefurnishes a glowing text for the Crosskey sermon.
